The war in the Crimea, with the Russians on one side arrayed against the allied forces of England, France, Turkey and Sardinia, on the other, coming as it did after a long period of European peace, induced many brilliant writers of the different nationalities to devote their best talents to a description of the thrilling events with which it was so uniquely replete. The terrible sufferings endured by the combatants; the brilliant achievements of the besiegers and the besieged, and the final catastrophe have been celebrated for many years in prose and song. Military and engineering experts have given the features interesting to students of their sciences the deepest study, and the English Parliament itself took part in one controversy at least growing out of a military question, but in a careful study of all the authorities available, I have thought to find a seeming want of appreciation of the extremely interesting and influential part taken by the naval forces engaged, which is without doubt due to the almost total lack of picturesque sea combats, and the absorbing pre-eminence of the magnificent combats on shore.
The writer has derived a keen enjoyment from the study of the various authorities consulted, in collecting and arranging the naval events of the war together with their bearing and influence upon its course,—he has further thought to discover that, as in the case of our own civil war, the influence of the navy has been considerably underrated and that lessons of the greatest importance concerning the use and abuse of sea power, more especially in its intimate relation to coast warfare and combined operations, lie not far from the surface of nearly all the operations of that war.
This war possesses a further interest for the casual reader in that fact that breaking, as it did, the thirty years' peace of Europe, it was inevitable that great changes should be exhibited in the material of war, if not in the methods of warfare. The development of armor dates from that war; the rifled musket also which in one action at least turned the tide of battle; horizontal shell fire, though not used for the first time, established itself for all time during that war, and for the first time were the full capabilities of insignificant earthworks demonstrated, when their defense was directed by a genius. The lesson of high command for coast batteries, elicited long before, was sealed by the naval assault on the works of Sevastopol; the first monitor, or the English idea of that famous vessel, received its baptism in the Sea of Azov, and the extreme usefulness of vertical fire from large mortars in sunken batteries was urged immediately at the close of that war.
For the purposes of this article it is necessary only to refer casually to the events preceding and leading up to the allied descent upon the Russian peninsula in the Black Sea.
On the 30th of November, six Russian ships of the line under the command of Admiral Nachimoff attacked and destroyed a Turkish squadron lying at anchor in Sinope. The Turkish squadron consisted of six frigates, one sloop, one steamer" and some transports, and was but poorly supported by the weak shore batteries. The Turks commenced the firing, and all the Turkish vessels were destroyed with the exception of the steamer, four thousand men being killed, and it is said that all of the four hundred survivors were wounded. The action was totally unequal, and has no interest in itself except as regards the profound impression created which made peace impossible, but as a strategic move it was certainly brilliant on the part of the Russians, except in so far as the destruction of the Turkish vessels is concerned, for if captured undestroyed they would have considerably augmented the Russian forces, and later might have turned a balance of vital importance to the Czar.
The circumstances immediately preceding this event, involving the relative strategic direction of the Russian and the allied squadrons, are interesting, and at the same time render it more difficult to understand the subsequent action of the Russian leaders in regard to their fleet. It will be remembered that the allied squadrons had entered the Bosporus on the 22d of October. The English Ambassador in Constantinople, Lord Stratford, had been informed by his government that " if the Russian fleet were to come out of Sevastopol, the allied fleets would then, as a matter of course, pass through the Bosporus." This meant nothing more nor less under the circumstances than that the leaving of Sevastopol by that Russian fleet became sufficient ground for naval hostilities. Now, the Russians made no secret of their naval preparations; the Czar intended that his navy should bear a prominent part in the defense of his empire, and the allies had full knowledge of the great and hurried preparations making in Sevastopol. No attempt, however, appears to have been made to observe the fleet in that port, and, indeed, until the actual sailing of the fleet such action might have been premature; but, when the Black Sea fleet came out in November and stretched across the Black Sea between the Crimea and the ports on the south shore, it certainly had become time to act.
On the 20th of November a Turkish steamer was captured, merchantmen were openly boarded by the Russians, and a cruising squadron of eight vessels masked the three ports of Sinope, Bartin and Amasbre. This was reported at once to Constantinople by the Turkish commander in Sinope, the news reaching Lord Stratford not later than the 26th, four days before Sinope, and apparently nothing was done, no observation vessels were sent out to procure precise information, no single effort was made to avert the impending catastrophe. France and England together had guaranteed to defend "Constantinople, or any other part of the Turkish territory, whether in Europe or in Asia, that might be in danger of attack." Yet the Turkish commander pleaded for help in vain—with the Russian fleet in front of Sinope, no attempt whatever appears to have been made to gain any information of its intentions,—if the Russians acted with judgment and quickly in destroying a hostile detachment, how can the conduct of the allies be characterized?
The largest guns in the Turkish fleet at Sinope were 24pounder solid shot guns, while the batteries on shore had little armament and the defenses were otherwise weak. The Russians were provided with the Paixhans shell guns, using time fuzes, which were first experimented with at Brest in the years 1821-24, but their destructive effect in war was first entirely demonstrated at Sinope, and at that time the war performance of shell with percussion or concussion fuzes was not known.
It may be of interest to quote from a letter written by General Paixhans, published in 1854, in which he outlines his conception for a naval policy which should follow upon the proper utilization of his weapons. He says: "Without entering into details, I shall add, that, in considering the different maritime and commercial conditions of other nations, it will be perceived that the mode of warfare best adapted to our country should rather be a system of desultory and unexpected expeditions and offensive cruises, than the heavy and disastrous system of regular battles and general actions. A hundred powerful and rapid frigates will evidently be more useful to France than forty or fifty ships of the line; and this change of system is supported by two authorities of great weight—that of the Emperor Napoleon I, towards the end of his career, and the decisive facts of our recent history. Other powers may indeed adopt the same change, but, if it were not to give this notice too wide a circulation, it would not be difficult to demonstrate that, if a general abandonment of the expensive system of fleets were to take place, France would have little to lose and much to gain."
It is curious in this passage to observe the resemblance in the effect produced in the general's mind by his great invention, and that produced in the minds of Admiral Aube and Gabriel Charmes and their followers a few years since when contemplating the torpedo and the swift cruiser. So far as the authority of Napoleon I is concerned, we know that he adopted eventually the only system that he was permitted to adopt by the English fleets.
Politically, but under pressure of public sentiment, this event of Sinope roused the English, and through a taunt addressed by the Czar to Napoleon III, the French were equally aroused. The allies, French and English, in February, 1854, demanded the evacuation of the Danubian Principalities by the 30th of April, and lacking an answer, war was declared in March. The allied troops were landed at Varna to defend the land fortresses on and south of the Danube, and Austria, backed diplomatically by Prussia, moved 50,000 men down the north bank of the Danube and demanded the evacuation of the territory occupied by Russia. In August the Russians abandoned the provinces and Austria occupied them. This might have been the end, but it seems that Sinope had been too much for England, and both England and France hesitated to withdraw without accomplishing anything further, having previously entertained the project of attacking Sevastopol.
The objects to be gained by that attack as stated by various high authorities were the destruction of the Russian fleet in the Black Sea, and the prostration of the fortifications defending that sea, and, again, that a blow must be struck at the very heart of the Russian power in the East. The difficulties inherent to these operations were clearly foreseen in London, though no idea existed as to the immense cost in treasure and life which was ultimately involved, before the objects stated were fully accomplished, if they were ever fully accomplished. The English Minister of War, writing subsequent to the withdrawal of the Russians from the Danube, says: "The difficulties of the siege of Sevastopol appear to Her Majesty's government to be more likely to increase than diminish by delay, and there is no prospect of a safe and honorable peace until the fortress is reduced, and the fleet taken or destroyed, it is on all accounts more important that nothing but insuperable impediments such as the want of ample preparations by either army or the possession by Russia of a force in the Crimea greatly outnumbering that which can be brought against it should be allowed to prevent the early decision to undertake these operations. It is probable that a large part of the Russian Army now retreating from the Turkish territory may be turned into the Crimea to re-enforce Sevastopol. If orders to this effect have not already been given, it is further probable that such a measure would be adopted as soon as it is known that the allied armies are in motion to commence active hostilities. As all communications by sea are now in the hands of the allied powers, it becomes of importance to endeavor to cut off all communication by land between the Crimea and the other parts of the Russian dominions." Sir Edward Hamley says, besides expressing his opinion that the Crimea was the most vulnerable part of the Russian Empire, that "it is certain that even a probability that it (a siege of Sevastopol) would last through the winter would have put an end to the project."
The war after the expulsion of the Russians from the Danube, became one purely offensive on the part of the allies, and after the conclusion of the tremendous struggle, its traces were quickly removed, the culmination taking place in the repudiation of the Black Sea clause of the Treaty of Paris when that city fell in 1871.
There are lessons to be drawn from that war which England will probably remember in case she should again be involved in war with Russia; circumstances since then having changed and somewhat in favor of Russia. An invasion of Russia by the Baltic or Black Sea is probably somewhat less certain of results and it is not likely that a much greater number of troops or munitions could be transported to either sea; while in another war France would probably not find her interests identical with those of England. An overwhelming number of Russians could be beforehand at any point threatened through the judicious development of the interior communications. The stress of the war in the Crimea hardly affected the Russian Standard of gold at that time and her power to make counter strokes coincident with her advance in Asia has vastly increased, while operations in either sea other than the blockade of both would without doubt be confined to what could be accomplished quickly by vessels alone, after the question of fleets has been disposed of.
There may be a particular interest attached to the operations of this war apart from their mere consideration as such, in a similitude of the scene of the war in its geography, the relative forces employed, both naval and military, its relation to the home bases, and lines of communication with what a war in the peninsula of Nova Scotia might be. In Nova Scotia I think it will be conceded that an important objective might be found—certainly one most valuable to England for many reasons, at the same time, without the command of the sea, a most difficult if not impossible one of accomplishment. The physical resemblance will be readily granted,—the peculiar shaped peninsula, almost an island with navigable waters on all sides, the climate, the proximity of great rivers, the long thin lines of communications, the indentations, and the great war harbor.
In discussing strategic questions, English writers are wont in referring to the possibilities of war with the United States to deprecate any discussion. This is easy for them, for in settling their position and policy with reference to nearer and more probable enemies, the case of war with us is provided for perhaps. For us, however, with England our only neighbor with coterminous territory to be seriously regarded at present, if we do not frankly consider the possibility, what possibility are we to consider?
The fact that Nova Scotia is a coal mine for the English fleets on this side of the Atlantic, while Vancouver is a good first or second on the Pacific, would make the loss of either or their investment a matter of great concern. The operations of the allied fleets in the Crimea may have a very useful lesson for us thus considered, and at any rate there will be apparent the proper and improper directions given to sea force by both sides, and the intimate relation which should exist between a fleet and an army, each performing its part in the strategic game. It may be apparent further that tremendous as is the factor " command of the sea " in warfare, that it is not everything in certain classes of operations, though vitally necessary; and that from the magnitude of operations, other than naval, peace may be forced in face of that command of the sea—this fact lying on the face of all history, and when borne in mind the error will be avoided of unduly appreciating that command.
The allies, English, French and Turkish, held the undisputed command of the sea owing to the inaction of the Russian fleet, and the Crimean war was also waged practically between two contiguous countries, Russia and Turkey, with a sea line or front common to both. The English and French fleets and forces, though originally from a distance, by reason of their bases strung along their routes from their own countries and the alliance with the Turks, found their main base securely established in Turkey. In these respects the operations of the war were vastly simpler than any that might be undertaken over a wide expanse of ocean with no bases near the coast attacked, and also in these respects a similarity exists in our own case in the civil war, considered in relation to the command of the sea, and the geographical relations of the territory involved. It may be also that besides England's position to-day, that of France in regard to our own has a certain similarity in the same respects, though the command of the seas in these days may not be so absolutely admitted. While it was urged upon the allies that the stroke should fall quickly, it happened that such could not be the case; delays were experienced from one reason and another, of which the outbreak of cholera was the most disastrous and far-reaching. The embarkation which took place at Varna was one of great difficulty, but finally the expedition was united in the bay of Balchick, the rendezvous.
The military situation was then about as follows. The Russian fleet in Sevastopol comprised fifteen sailing line-of-battle ships, seven frigates, two brigs, one corvette; the Vladimir (a powerful steamer) and eleven lighter class steamers, mounting 1908 guns and manned by 18,500 seamen. The united number of allied transports was 600, the covering fleet carrying 3000 pieces of artillery. The sailing vessels were towed by steamers; coaling ships accompanied the expedition, and boats especially constructed were carried alongside the transports to facilitate the landing, while an English force of ten line-of-battle ships, including two powerful screw steamers; two fifty-gun frigates, and thirteen heavily armed, though smaller steamers, were held free from transport duty to cover the remainder of the expedition, while many heavy guns were transported on platforms laid upon two boats.
Of the remaining war vessels, the French had fifteen line-of-battle ships, and ten or twelve steamers of good size; the Turks, eight line-of-battle ships and three steamers, but all encumbered as transports, while the military force embarked for the expedition amounted to 61,000 infantry, 1000 cavalry and 128 guns.* The Russian forces in the Crimea engaged in the first battle consisted of about 33,000 infantry, 3400 cavalry and 120 guns, while the total force in the Crimea reaching nearly 60,000 men, re-enforcements being hastened forward from the Empire and from the Danube.
The expedition sailed on the 7th of September from a rendezvous "forty miles west of Cape Tarkan" and but eighty miles or so from Sevastopol, where the leading ships anchored on the 9th. From there the coast was reconnoitered by steamers from Eupatoria to Balaklava, Old Fort on Kalamita Bay being finally selected for the landing place, through considerations which must always obtain in such selections; proper water near the beach, room for the troops after landing in order to take position and deploy rapidly and of such a character as to enable the ships to cover the landing by their fire. The landing occupied four days from the beginning until the time when the troops were ready to advance, bad weather prevailing during part of the time occupied in landing having delayed that operation unduly. I have nowhere seen any reasons given why the Russians should not have fallen upon the detachments already on shore during the nights, but the war shows many seeming examples of lost opportunities.
From the time of anchoring off Cape Tarkan to the time when the landing was completed was nine days, during five of which the allied expedition was not at all united, in fact it was not all united until the landing was completed on the 18th. No efforts were made by the allies to blockade the Russian fleet in Sevastopol, and but few if any efforts were made to observe that fleet. The fleet was the equal if not the superior to the only force held ready by the allies to oppose and attack it, and certainly the expedition itself was in disorder. It is imputed to the Russians, and with good reason, that a great opportunity was lost, the Russian admirals begging to be allowed to attack the allies, but meeting only refusal. They were told that the men and guns were needed for defenses on shore, and their services there make some of the bright pages of the siege, the vessels themselves after their sacrifice it the entrance to Sevastopol playing a useful though an ignoble part.
If this action in regard to the fleet be contrasted with others, de Ruyter's in the Schoneveldt, for instance, and the opportunity considered—the clumsy allied flotilla spread over many miles, but a few hours in time from Sevastopol—it becomes more difficult to understand the inaction of the Russian fleet, nor is it easy to comprehend the action of the allied fleets under such a menace. Nothing but confidence in their ability to deal with the Russian squadron on any terms or a knowledge that it would not attack, can explain the leaders' loose way of protecting the expedition en route.
It is a matter of fact that the chief anxiety of the commanders-in-chief of the expedition was due to an expected attack on the part of the Russian vessels, and yet what were the means concerted to meet it? The simple telling off of a portion of the armed force of about equal strength with the Russian squadron, leaving it unencumbered with troops and their holding it on the flank of the transport flotilla, but with one vessel detailed for duty in front of Sevastopol. The naval conduct of the war has been criticised by able English officers since, so it is not unbecoming for anyone to express surprise that well-known simple strategic principles were so utterly neglected. What reason existed why that covering squadron should not have been placed where the observing vessel was, in front of Sevastopol? Then the landing could have gone forward in absolute security, there being no fear in the expedition that the landing would be opposed on the beach and the only threat which could have been offered seems to have been left unnoticed.
Prince Menschikoff was High Admiral of the Russian fleet, and in his absence Korniloff, the Chief-of-staff, was in command. The approach of the allied fleet was signalled to Sevastopol, and orders were at once given for the sailing of the Black Sea fleet, but the first day the wind was northwest in the offing. In the evening the fact was signalled that the allied fleet was coming to anchor, the Russians pleasing themselves by recalling that the date, the 14th of September, was the anniversary of Napoleon's entry into Moscow, but the weather was now calm, and Kinglake says: "also the general desire to attack the allies while landing was not now so great." After the battle of the Alma on the 21st of September, Korniloff called a naval council, and addressing the council said, amongst other things: "I therefore propose to put to sea and attack the enemy, crowded as he is off Cape Lukul. I think that, fortune favoring us, we might disperse the enemy's armada, and thus deprive the allied armies of supplies and re-enforcements. In the event of failure, we shall be able to avoid a disgraceful capture; for, supposing that we do not succeed in boarding the enemy's ships, we can at all events blow them up when they close alongside, together with our own. While thus saving the honor of the Russian flag, the seamen will be defending their port; for the allied fleets, even if victorious, would be so weakened by the loss of many ships, that they would not dare to attack the strong sea batteries of Sevastopol; and without the co-operation of the fleet, the allied armies could not capture the town, if fortified and defended by our troops, until the arrival of a fresh army from Russia, and then, with the united exertions we might crush the enemy. The absence of all order in the disposition of the enemy's fleet during the landing and off Cape Lukul, the carelessness of their cruisers, which have not yet captured even one of our steamers on the Black Sea during the whole summer, the carelessness of the allied admirals, who have allowed our squadrons to cruise freely in sight of Sevastopol…who have even allowed the steamer Tamar to leave Sevastopol, and to cruise, caring little for the countless steamers of the enemy, on the lines by which the allies communicate with the Turkish ports, all this plainly proves that against such an enemy success is not impossible." Korniloff's picture of the condition of the allied fleets was not entirely a true one, and the time had gone by perhaps for the rally which should have been made near the 14th, yet he went to Menschikoff and announced that he was going to sea, with the result that he was forbidden to do so under threat of being displaced.
After the landing the advance of the allies southward was made along the coast with the right flank resting on the sea, covered by the fleet. A slight skirmish took place at the river Bulganak, but the army pushing on reached the river Alma, where the battle of the same name was fought. The vessels do not seem to have played much of a part in this battle, although some French ships threw a few shell over the plateau occupied by the Russian left on the south bank of the river. The only point to notice in connection with this battle, or rather the advance to the Alma, as bearing upon the subject, is the opinion expressed by Sir Edward Hamley that " the Russians by attacking in force on the allies' left, away from the sea might have decisively embarrassed the advance of the allies, unless a crushing defeat could have been inflicted upon them, although by having command of the sea, thanks to the supineness of the Russian fleet, the allies could have fallen back upon their ships." But if they had so fallen back upon their ships, what a great advantage the Russians would have reaped in harassing them in retreat and in the time gained—second only to the effect upon the undertaking of a desperate attack upon the expedition afloat, in the first instance, and whilst re-embarking in the second.
There is a curious coincidence and sameness in the records of most invasions in the manner in which the invaders make good their foothold by winning the first battle, it usually being brought on by the native arrives before they are prepared to ensure success. If the allies had been driven to their ships from the Alma, by the time they could have prepared for another attempt if they had desired to make it, the Crimea would have been in a far better state to repel the invasion.
Following the battle of the Alma the allies proceeded to the north side of the harbor of Sevastopol at the Belbek. Whether to establish the army on the north side and on the road to Bakchi Serai, the main line of the Russian communications, or to proceed to the south was a question that at the time was carefully considered. Arguments were strong on either side, and since the war it has been and is still a disputed point upon which the authorities widely differ. The operation of proceeding down the coast direct to the north side with the right resting on the fleet and, in a combined engagement with the land and sea forces, the occupation of that side and the turning of its guns on the south, is one that seemed very attractive and especially commends itself to naval people. Concerning this question, an authority before quoted says in effect, that this was manifestly not only a quite desperate but a fruitless enterprise, except…the fleet should take a principal part in the attack, meaning that some of the ships should have passed in and attacked the vessels in the harbor, while others engaged the forts, the army holding itself in readiness to descend from the heights. In Sir E. Hamley's language: "Sevastopol might have fallen in a storm of battle as tremendous as the world has ever witnessed."
Delays before the question was settled enabled Todleben to strengthen his positions, twelve of the forty-seven guns in the Star fort bearing upon the approaches from the north. The fort itself was a land defense covering the forts in the harbor, being in turn looked into from the heights still further north. Nine more guns were mounted in batteries, some of them covering the approach by the coast, and finally Todleben got twenty-nine guns available from the northern defense. The allies might have attacked the Star fort and batteries at a time when the whole defending force was only 11,000. Both Todleben and Lord Raglan believed the attack by the north the true policy, however, the combined north attack was abandoned and there appears no other factor of importance in this decision than a wholesome respect for the defenses. The delay further enabled the Russians to sink seven of their vessels in the entrance of the harbor and the remainder of the fleet were thus secured from the sea and were left free to concentrate their fire on the north side. Thenceforward the Russian fleet practically ceased to exist as a factor in the war, except as the men who had manned it were distributed as trained gunners, and the naval guns were thus drawn to the defense of the land lines, a not very important matter, for the communications with the Empire were never suspended nor interfered with until long after, and were never entirely cut off—great as were the services of the seamen and guns, there was no lack of guns in Sevastopol and shortly no lack of trained gunners.
As regards the question of the fleet engaging the forts, more will appear further on, but as it did not attack before the entrance was obstructed, there can be nothing but surmise as to the result if it had done so. Again, if the allies had succeeded in occupying the north side, from the lack of safe harbors and with westerly winds on that side, the communication with the fleet would have been extremely precarious. Other considerations appeared, and many plans suggested themselves, but all but one involved in one way or another the jeopardizing of the line of communications with the base, the fleet, or at least the immobilizing of a large part of the army for the protection of that line. There is no need here to point out the complexity of the questions that present themselves to the officers in charge of such an expedition, and in forming a judgment on this disputed point, it is well to bear in mind that besides the width of the bay, nearly three-quarters of a mile, the Star fort was a very strong work surrounded by a deep ditch, and was entirely safe from the fire of the allied fleet, while its approaches were directly in range of the guns of the Russian vessels inside.*
The allied army now moved to the southeast, some of the vessels of the allied fleet engaging Fort Constantine and the Star fort at long range at the same time without effect, the base being changed to Balaklava by the fleet moving to that point. It is only important to notice regarding the flank march of the allies the precarious position in which they were again placed during that march by the loose manner in which it was made; the Russian army, having left Sevastopol in order to keep up the communications with Russia and crossing their line of march at right angles, being at one time actually in sight of the allied army. The Russians, however, incomprehensibly failed to seize the opportunity, and Balaklava fell into the hands of the combined land and sea forces on the 26th of September without difficulty, four shots only being fired by the garrison, which consisted of but seven officers and sixty soldiers. The heights inland from Balaklava were quickly provided with fortifications to resist an attack from that quarter by the Russians.
When the Russian commanders became aware of the change of front of the allies and its accompanying change of base to Balaklava and Kamiesh Bay, which was occupied by the French, all their forces in Sevastopol, amounting now to 35,850 people, were concentrated for the defence of the south side, the allied army now resting between the two points, the English on the right, the French on the left.
Passing over the burning questions of the moment to the allies concerning the relative merits of an attempt to carry the works by assault or to trust to the more certain, but infinitely slower, means of siege in regular fashion, which was eventually adopted, the next event of importance was one in which the allied fleets took a prominent part. At the time of this event, the 17th of October, the military situation was roughly as follows: the allied army were investing the southern side from the Quarantine to the Careenage, while the Russian communications were entirely open to the northward with the Empire, and a Russian army, posted for the purpose of keeping them open, was left free and unobserved by the allies. The plan of an extensive siege having been adopted, trenches were opened by the allies in the orthodox manner, but at distances considerably in excess of those laid down by the great masters of siege operations in the time of Louis XIV, the improvements in ordnance having made themselves felt. After much correspondence and consultation between the commanders, military and naval, it was agreed finally that a combined military and naval artillery attack, to be followed by an assault, should be made upon the stronghold. It will be remembered that the Russian fleet, or what was left of it, after the sinking of the seven ships in the entrance of the harbor of Sevastopol, was effectually sealed up in that harbor. It was realized that the ships of the attacking squadron might suffer severely from an engagement with the fortifications, and at any rate there seems to have been no such confidence as would follow upon any assumption as to the superiority of ships in a conflict with forts. The object of the effective fleets had been simply to command the Black Sea, and their engagement with the fortifications was regarded with grave distrust, for in case of their being considerably injured the possibility existed for the sallying out of what was left of the Russian fleets. In any case the safety of the communications of the army, and consequently of the expedition itself, depended upon the efficiency of the fleet. The Russians might have done well to have heeded Korniloff as to these considerations.
In line between Fort Constantine and the Quarantine and Alexander forts were sunk three 84's, one 120, two 84's, and one 54, in the order given. Inside was a strong boom; further inside was a strong boom of chain cables floated by timber; between Fort Nicholas and the westward of Fort St. Michel, and again inside, were sunk, beginning on the north, one 60, one 84, one 20, one 84, and one 60; the remainder of the Russian fleet lying inside the pontoon bridge, consisting of four 84's, one 120, one 110, and three steamers. Near Inkerman were several sunken steamers, besides several brigs and corvettes. To abridge at this time what might be made a long discussion of dispositions and events preceding the action of the 17th, I will quote the following from Kinglake: "It cannot be said that the conclusion of those who judged Sevastopol safe against an attack from the sea was ever upset or shaken by the subsequent course of events. It is equally certain, however, that nothing occurred which could be used as proof by experiment that the place was impregnable against an attack from the sea, for no irruption into the roadstead was ever attempted by the allies, and the mere fact that an Anglo-French fleet lay hovering over the prey for a year and a half without breaking in to seize it has hardly so close a bearing upon the question as it might seem to have at first sight." Here he enters upon a discussion to show that an Anglo-French fleet is of less account than either acting singly, which, with all deference to the distinguished author, and granting all that can be said against mixed commands—assumes too much. He continues: "Seemingly, however, the reasonings of those who concluded that the place was impregnable by sea were as sound as reasonings of the kind could well be, for if an artillery adept bends over a plan of the roadstead and marks out with ruler and pencil the scope of the fire from the forts as well as from the ships of the Russians, he finds the radii converging so thickly upon the mouth of the roadstead, and. upon the waters leading on toward the man-of-war harbor, that, even though no obstructions be supposed like that of sunken ships, he sees pointed out upon the paper the assurance of ruin to a fleet which might strive to break in." And again: "However, there stands the fact that whatever might have been possible to such a man as Cochrane, invested with the sole command and untrammeled by the fetters of an alliance, the commanders of the Anglo-French fleet agreed with the Russians in believing that Sevastopol was safe against an attack from the sea. Therefore for the purpose of understanding the limit, not of what might be possible in the abstract, but of what could be done by invaders impressed with this belief, it may be taken for granted that although the Anglo-French fleet ruled unchecked over all the high seas, its dominion stopped short of the mouth of the Sevastopol roadstead." The author does not seem to have had in mind the immunity that such harbors as Sevastopol, or harbors less well defended, had enjoyed in the presence of fleets commanded by such men as Nelson, or St. Vincent, or Cornwallis. Continuing the author says: "It has to be said once for all that as means of breaking through that part of the enemy's line which consisted of seaward defences, the fleets were of no avail. In the roadstead and in all its creeks the Russian was master. Nor of this was there ever much question, for in judging the limits to which the allied fleets could push their dominion, the invaders and invaded were of one mind."
The troops in Sevastopol were increased, owing to the pleadings of Korniloff, from the Russian army in the field by 25,000 men, and the allied armies were increased in strength by detachments from the respective fleets. The cannonade between the siege batteries and the allies, which took place on the 17th of October, began early in the morning, and has been described as the greatest artillery duel the earth had ever witnessed up to that time. In the plans for the co-operation of the allied fleets nothing but a bombardment at comparatively long ranges was contemplated, and their co-operation at all was forced upon them by a complexity of causes, which will be referred to later. The very plans looking to the character of the operations to be undertaken by the fleets underwent a change on the morning of the assault, the idea of bombarding while under way being given up. The fleets were anchored in a crescent-shaped line, the French and Turkish vessels having the southern end, beginning at Chersonese Bay and at distances varying from 1600 to 2000 yards from the Quarantine sea fort, the nearest, and from 1800 to 2000 yards from Fort Alexander; the English fleet at the northern end of the line at equal distances from Fort Constantine; a portion of the English fleet, and a fine one, was enabled to take position closer to Fort Constantine; and several steam frigates, the Samson, Tribune, Terrible, and Sphinx, a steam sloop, the Spitfire, a steam gunboat, the Lynx, and the ammunition vessels were left free to move about, these vessels being especially enjoined to aid disabled vessels. The allies were familiar with the defences of Sevastopol and knew that besides the batteries, only three of the forts could bear upon the ships keeping outside the entrance—Alexander, Constantine, and the Quarantine sea fort. Fort Alexander mounted in all 56 guns, 27 in casemates, 51 of the total number bearing upon the fleet. Fort Constantine had 97 guns. It was shaped like a horseshoe and was especially vulnerable in one direction, which direction was especially favored for the allies from considerations of the depth of water, and but 43 of its guns could bear upon the fleet, two tiers of guns were in casemates and one tier above in the open. The Quarantine sea fort had 58 guns, all mounted in the open, 33 of which could bear upon the fleet. Besides these, there were two small batteries on the heights above the northern shore, the Wasp and telegraph batteries mounting respectively 8 and 5 guns.
The Wasp battery was a small square tower elevated above the water 130 feet, concealed by its glacis. Of the 8 guns it mounted, the greatest estimate only allows 5 to bear upon the vessels; the Russians say one. The Telegraph battery was an earthwork elevated 100 feet, with 5 guns bearing on the fleet. The action of the in-shore squadron, from the power and mobility of the vessels composing it, from the nearness to which it could approach the fort and batteries, from the different character of the fortifications involved, and the varying immunity thus secured, becomes the most interesting, and will receive a little more extended treatment. The sailing vessels of the fleets were towed into position in the same manner adopted later by Admiral Farragut at Mobile, and for the same reasons. The action of the fleets was divided, from its nature, into two parts—that of the main body anchored in crescent form, and that of the in-shore squadron. Without entering into details, the facts and results will now be stated. The fire of the fleet was from 1100 pieces of heavy artillery. The forts could bring to bear but 152 guns, of which 47 were in casemates. Kinglake says: "If this was the heaviest sea cannonade that up to that time had been known, it was also, in proportion to its greatness, the most harmless one ever delivered." The in-shore squadron consisted of the Agamemnon— the flagship of Lyons—and the Sanspareil (two powerful steamers carrying respectively 91 and 67 guns), the London, 90 guns; Albion, 90 guns; and Arethusa, 50 guns, as well as sailing vessels towed by steamers lashed alongside on the off side. Admiral Dundas, commanding-in-chief the English fleet, had issued hampering instructions to the captains of these vessels. He himself disapproved the attack upon the forts by ships, but his instructions being set aside by the captains, the engagement of the in-shore squadron was really a fair test in most respects. The Agamemnon was piloted to a most advantageous position by the Circassia, a small steam tender, where she anchored head and stern and warped into the desired position in an almost perfect dead angle of Fort Constantine, where but few guns could be brought to bear upon her, and where in turn she could rake the fort, besides taking it in reverse. The range was 800 yards; the Sanspareil anchored astern at 900 yards; the London astern of the Sanspareil at 1500 yards. Later the Arethusa and the Albion came into positions astern and opened upon the cliff batteries—the Arethusa at 700 yards from the Telegraph battery and the Albion at 600 yards from the Wasp battery. Still later, when four of the vessels (all but the Agamennon) had been so disabled that three of them had hauled off and one of them had changed her position, reinforcements came in the shape of the Bellerophon. The London again closed in and the Sanspareil resumed her old position. The Rodney moved in and also the Queen; in fact, all the English fleet with the exception of three vessels came sooner or later into contest with Fort Constantine and the two little batteries; the steamers under way taking part as well, but at greater ranges.
Interesting as are all the details connected with this fine engagement, they will not be dwelt upon here. The results have been given tersely and strongly by Kinglake in full knowledge of everything connected with it, and will be given in his language, with but few comments.
"First. At ranges of from 1600 to 1800 yards a whole French fleet failed to make any useful impression upon a fort at the water's edge, though its guns were all ranged in open batteries and firing from over the parapet.
"Secondly. An earthen battery mounting only five guns, but placed on the cliff at an elevation of 100 feet, inflicted grievous losses and injury to four powerful English ships of war, and actually disabled two of them without itself having a gun dismounted, and without even losing one man.
"Thirdly. At ranges of from 800 to 1200 yards, and with the aid of steam frigates throwing shells at a range of 1600 yards, three English ships in ten minutes brought to ruin and cleared of their gunners the whole of the open-air batteries containing 27 guns, which were on the top of a great stone fort at the water's edge.
"Fourthly. The whole allied fleet operating in one part of it at a range of from 1600 to 1800 yards, and in another part of it at ranges of from 800 to 1200 yards, failed to make any impression upon casemated batteries protected by a good stone wall from five to six feet thick.
"Fifthly. Under the guns of a great fort by the water's edge, which, although it had lost the use of its topmost pieces of artillery, still had all its casemates entire and the batteries within them uninjured, a great English ship at a distance of only 800 yards lay at anchor and fighting for hours without sustaining any ruinous harm."
Commenting upon these findings, it will be well to notice in regard to the first that 73 fort guns responded to the 600 or more of the French, one-half their total number. Six guns in the fort in the open were dismounted, eleven men killed and thirty-nine wounded—the French fleet suffering heavy damage, which is not stated in detail, and losing 200 in killed and wounded. Nothing but imperfect aiming can account for this extraordinary result, the range, while great, not preventing great damage where hits were secured. The targets of the French were open batteries; as a matter of fact, the majority of the French projectiles flew to the eastward of the forts. In regard to the third, the extreme injury inflicted upon the upper battery of Fort Constantine was caused by a single lucky shell from the Tribune at 1600 yards, which caused the explosion of a store of ammunition, together with the fire of the Agamemnon, Sanspareil and London at close range delivered from the dead angle before mentioned. Kinglake, in another place, says: "What they (the ships) could inflict upon the open-air batteries proved to be sheer ruin, and what they could do against the casemates turned out to be almost nothing."
The masonry forts were built of slabs of white freestone, and were of great thickness, age having only solidified the works. After the occupation of the south side by the allies, and before the conclusion of hostilities (Kinglake's account ends with the death of Lord Raglan) the Russians kept up an incessant fire from the north side with the object of completing the work of destruction begun with their withdrawal from the south side. They knew, of course, the precise location of strong points, and their weak features, and under this precise fire the works crumbled easily. It seemed to have been demonstrated by this that some of the superiority of fixed works over ships would have disappeared if it had been possible, as in some former actions, such as at Algiers, Acre, or San Juan d'Ulloa, to have laid the ships quietly alongside the forts.
As regards the fifth finding, it is well to remember that the great English ship which lay at anchor and fought for hours had secured a most happy position, where, by the same authority, she enjoyed comparative immunity. In the Wasp battery, 22 men were wounded and one gun put out of action. The Telegraph battery suffered no harm whatever. The entire Russian loss in killed and wounded was 138. Two English ships had to be sent to Constantinople to refit, and many other vessels were seriously damaged. The losses in killed and wounded, exclusive of the Turks, was 520; the loss to the in-shore squadron alone was 300.
In this single duel between the in-shore squadron and forts some facts stand out in bold relief which, though only showing what might be expected from reasoning, as well, go far to confirm the experiences of other similar contests, notably, the futility of an open air arrangement of guns a fleur d'eau; the immunity enjoyed by casemates at that day with overhead cover when their material and thickness were proportioned to the strength of the attack, as well as the limitations placed upon them which control the arc of fire of the guns, and the extreme of the offensive and defensive power enjoyed by mere earthenwork batteries placed at an elevation and masked. It would seem unnecessary to refer to the explosion on the top of Fort Constantine but for the fact that, through all the accounts of encounters between vessels and fortifications as well as in siege operations on shore, there runs a monotonous record of just such accidents, usually attended with paralyzing results. The lesson is obvious and is so simple that no elucidation is demanded. The main attack on the land front proved abortive largely, if not entirely, from the same cause, while the explosion of a quantity of ammunition in the French siege batteries on Mount Rodolph placed the French in such a position that they would have been unable to take part in the assault, and consequently the assault could not have succeeded. The siege batteries had accomplished on the land fronts all that was expected of them.
Looked at in another way, I think it is safe to say that the action of the ships was wholly resultless. With the weapons of the day and the defensive works it was recognized that decisive results could only be secured by close action. Close action meant, however, greater injury to the vessels, and that meant greater opportunity to the Russian fleet. The whole weight of testimony and reason goes to show that the harbor was impregnable to the fleet. No diversion was caused, for the operations on the land side and on the sea side were so widely separated in distance that all that could be expected was the withdrawal of men from the one side to the other, and the seacoast batteries only needed few men more than their regular garrisons for their proper and efficient war service. The damage to the fleets was absolutely without any return, and as they could come to close action only by passing inside the obstructions and turning the outer works, which operations were impossible, it seems evident that half-way measures were worse than useless.
The attitude of the fleets before Sevastopol seems to have been a clear example of the manner in which fortifications in any way formidable had come to be regarded. The fact that the entrance to the harbor was efficiently obstructed exerted a profound influence, also, on the minds of the attacking admirals, already sufficiently impressed with the evil consequences which inevitably were sure to attend the entire expedition should any serious damage be inflicted on the fleet, which alone sustained that expedition. The action of the fleet, as it proved, produced not even a diversion, and it can easily be believed that had there been no obstructions in the harbor, and had the fleet proceeded to a main attack itself under the command of Lyons, who seems to have been the moving spirit of the occasion, though not the commander-in-chief, from the injuries inflicted by a few works, as it happened, that it would have suffered greatly and have failed ultimately, it will be remembered further that the forts engaged were provided only with their regular garrisons, and that the entrance of the harbor was the least defended portion of it. But this is only surmise, and it is quite impossible to separate the two attacks; success on either side of the city meant success on the other. However, if the relative losses under these circumstances are considered, as well as the fact that an attempt at entrance must have been subjected to a fire gradually becoming more and more concentrated, while the following vessels would have been unable to support them, I am inclined to think it was a good thing for the fleet that there were obstructions. The action was further remarkable in calling attention anew to the value of command for batteries, and to the great exposure of open batteries a fleur d’eau. Almost every engagement between forts and ships in former wars had demonstrated these facts, and notice had been drawn to them repeatedly, but the teachings seem not to have been generally regarded.
While the casemated works engaged suffered only slightly, and the gunners being enabled to return to their guns at any time whenever the fire of the fleet slackened, the open batteries were completely silenced.
The Russian ordnance is said to have been superior to that of the fleets, especially in the matter of time fuzes, and it is also given as a reason for the little effect of the fire of the fleet that its shell guns were of little use against the masonry, or rubble, of the works, the only guns of any use being those using solid shot, and yet it was the explosion of a shell that caused the damage on the top of Fort Constantine. This attack was made by the fleet without any especial appliances, and undoubtedly numerous mortar vessels would have been very effective. In speaking of the conclusion of the action, Sir Howard Douglass says: “In consequence of the little impression made, apparently, on the forts, when darkness was coming on the fleets retired to their anchorage.” At this time the Russian batteries were in full fire.
Having referred previously to the differences of opinion which existed between the leaders of the fleets themselves, and between them and the leaders of the armies, the action and its results (or rather lack of results) having as well been briefly sketched, it may not be amiss, at this time, to look a little further into the situation to the end, perhaps, that a better sense may be had as to when and how it may be expedient to risk a fleet in action with coast defenses, or at least so far as a better sense may be held from the circumstances of this action. The French admiral was under the orders of the French General Canrobert. The English admiral, Dundas, and the English general, Lord Raglan, were not on cordial terms with each other, while the second in command of the English fleet, Lyons, was upon the closest terms of intimacy with Lord Raglan, and under secret encouragement from England had been upon the verge of taking action independently of Dundas. Lyons further constantly urged upon Lord Raglan decisive action, and up to the time of his in-shore attack was in favor of assault.
It has before been said that opinions, both Russian and allied, were largely in favor of the belief that the combined assault from the north side would have been successful, and also that the intended assault of the 17th was bound to succeed. It was even believed that the assault on the land side alone was sure of success. Yet to doubly assure success it was thought that the co-operation of the fleet was extremely desirable. A further factor in favor of this co-operation was the extreme eagerness of the fleet itself, which is said to have been so great as to endanger the maintenance of authority. This can readily be believed when the attitude of the second in command is considered, and the general belief in the success of the attack, in which all wished to participate. The French admiral, under orders, and the English admiral, under pressure, agreed to the attack, and, while notifying the generals that the fleet had but 70 rounds of ammunition, requested information as to the time of the attack. They were informed that it would be advisable to divide the attack into two parts, one to be delivered coincident with the preliminary bombardment, the other with the assault. At a council held in the fleet subsequent to the decision, Lyons came to lose some of his ardor, and when before long, he came to the chief command, he never made any attempt upon Sevastopol whatever.
The admirals had no difficulty in concluding that the attempt at forcing an entrance was quite out of the question, close action, except in the case of the in-shore squadron, being as well put on one side, for the obstructions and the character of the water front generally forbade it.
A forced entrance and a general close action being barred, there remained other alternatives, of which the one selected, bombardment over the entire front at long range, remains to be considered, and one or two others which found favor with Dundas. The one selected was confessedly weak, for with the ordnance of the day, the character of the works and their location, and the shortness of ammunition in the fleet, but one result could have been expected, and as it proved not even a diversion was produced. Had the land attack succeeded it can be said in the light of events that the credit to the fleet would have been gratuitous. In failure the Russians had the right to claim a victory over the fleet, which retired disabled and short of ammunition, the exhaustion of the ammunition being only a question of time and had been foreseen. In palliation for the form of attack adopted it has been urged that in case the bombardment on the land front had produced a panic in the city that the fire from the fleet would have added to the confusion. This is undoubtedly true, but the careful and well-directed fire from a few steamers delivered at the right instant would have been fully as effective without entailing so serious results, and this instant would have been the moment for the assault by the troops; but the generals wanted the coincident bombardments.
On the evening before the action the French admiral notified Dundas that owing to the shortness of ammunition supply he would not open fire until ten or eleven o’clock, half past six having been the hour settled upon. On the morning of the attack the French admiral further notified Dundas that he would fight at anchor abreast the southern forts instead of under way, and declared he would fight that way whether the English fought or not. We have seen the results. The bombardment by the fleets in the original plan, to have begun at half-past six, was postponed by Hamelin to ten or eleven, and only commenced about one. At half-past ten, however, the explosions on Mount Rodolph made of the land attack a failure; consequently the naval bombardment, besides being resultless, was entirely pointless. Subsequently Dundas communicated to Lord Raglan that he had undertaken the bombardment against his better judgment, and should not assume the responsibility for its failure.
In looking now to what alternative methods there were available for the active participation of the navy in the assault, one of them is supported by the high authority of Dundas, backed by an almost unbroken historical record of success for such operations so undertaken; in fact, a method which brought success to some of the operations of the same war in both the Black Sea and Baltic. It was, to make a double demonstration to the northward of the cliff batteries, where the water was suitable, by means of a landing party supported by the guns of the steam fleet. A formidable party could have been thrown on shore without difficulty, and aided by fire from the steamers could have menaced, if not have taken, some of the batteries to the north. Undoubtedly this method of attack would have created a diversion important if not vital. This movement would have thrown the main strength of the fleet upon a portion of the enemy’s line, which is one of the soundest of military maxims. The Russians thus attacked in force on the whole land front to the south, an important flank menaced by both land and sea, and a large part of their line of defense completely isolated from participation, must certainly have made detachments for the purpose of averting this attack. Dundas desired this in the first instance, and next to this desired close action, which was denied him by the French admiral taking the south end of the line of battle, where lacking gunboats or especial vessels it was alone possible. Abreast of Fort Constantine the shoal extended 1200 yards, and in the turn to the N.W. of the contour, where a range of 800 yards could be secured, but one or two vessels could be advantageously placed, while still to the northward the position for large vessels was shown to be untenable under the high batteries which could not themselves be harmed.
The portion of the defensive line abreast the French position, however, offered a singularly favorable opportunity for close action which the French avoided. The Quarantine sea fort covered the entrance to the Quarantine inlet, and as before said, the guns were all mounted a fleur d'eau in the open, a form of battery which has always been considered as quite vulnerable to a close attack. Attacked as it was by the French from a distance, it was silenced but not seriously injured, the French shell, however, so covered the ground between it and the city that during the action but one man succeeded in passing over the zone. Only a portion of the guns of Fort Alexander could bear upon the French vessels, and here, then, was an opportunity for an attack which probably would not have been without results. An approach to the Quarantine fort to any desirable distance was, owing to the depth of water, quite possible, and Fort Alexander would have been still more marked. Considering that, as it was, the Quarantine fort was silenced, that it was also impossible to have reinforced it, it is not too much to hazard an opinion that the work would have been destroyed and that the fleet would have seized in the Quarantine Cove, a most important point, where a diversion might have been readily effected. In the course of this operation it still would have been 2000 yards from the north forts, which might readily have been occupied in returning the fire of a few vessels. A threatened landing in this Cove would have created an equal diversion with one to the north, though it could have been the more readily met by the Russians: yet it would have been as readily supported by the French left attack, and we have seen how easily the Cove could have been controlled.
Next in the order of events came the memorable action of Balaklava, which had for one result the narrowing of the allied outworks about the town of Balaklava placed on the heights above the town. Following this action, it was proposed to unite the two bases of the allies in one in Kamiesh Bay, but this scheme fell through owing to the professed inability of the commissariat to supply the British army without Balaklava. The position of the allies at this time seems to have been very grave—outnumbered both in men and in artillery, shut up in a little corner, depending wholly upon that command of the sea for every supply—while the Russians' resources were measured only by the size of the Empire of Russia, their only drawbacks, the length of their line of communications and the severity of the climate—and it is somewhat of a question which was the besieged and which the besiegers, while the allies further suffered from the evils of a mixed command. Granting the command of the sea so vital to an enterprise of the kind under consideration, and the fact that the allies were ready to replace any number of destroyed armies by fresh ones, I have yet to see any good reason why the army then in the Crimea was not entirely destroyed, save the incompetency of the Russian commanders and the lack of harmony or system in their actions in the field, which was plainly exhibited in the next bloody battle, that of Inkerman.
Some of the reasons assigned for the Russian defeat at Inkerman were the mass formation in which the Russian troops fought, and the fact that the majority of their troops were armed with old-fashioned fire-locks, while the English, at least, were provided with the Minie gun, whence it followed that the Russian ranks were under fire and suffering before their own weapons were in any way effective. Sir Edward Hamley says in regard to the battle of Inkerman, that defeat in their position (the allies'), having only sea cliffs behind them, would have been absolute and ruinous, and behind such defeat lay national degradation. This is perhaps too strong a view of the situation, but well exhibits the uncertain tenure held by an invading force, and the desperate nature of the situation of the allies. The same authority, contemplating the allied success at Inkerman, says, after commenting on the fact that the Russians could not beat the allies in battle: "We could do nothing else but keep our hold, and, keeping it, it was a matter of demonstration that the powers which held command of the sea must prevail over the power whose theatre of war was separated from its resources by roadless deserts." And again: "the defeat of that slender division on its ridge would have carried with it consequences absolutely tremendous." Yet another clue to the success of the allies may be found in the official report of the commission sent by the English ministry to investigate the condition of affairs in the Crimea, after the months of suffering following the battle of Inkerman: "Both men and officers, when so reduced that they were hardly fit for the lighter duties of the camp, scorned to be excused the severe and perilous work of the trenches lest they should throw an undue amount of duty upon their comrades, yet they maintained every foot of ground against all the efforts of the enemy, and with numbers so small that perhaps no other troops would ever have made the attempt." The work of the siege went on, and it is interesting to note that it was considered important to make the Malakof an early objective for a reason urged by General Sir John Burgoyne, that a few guns placed there would effectually rid the allies of the fire from the Russian ships in the harbor.
The hurricane of the 14th November caused great havoc among the vessels in Balaklava and Kamiesh; ammunition and store ships were destroyed, twenty-one vessels in all being wrecked. This hurricane was the beginning of the miseries endured by the allies, especially the English and Turks, which lasted until February of the next year, at which time the allied troops numbered not less than 100,000 effective men in spite of the losses from all causes. The intervening months were occupied in various minor operations, but in February the Russians, fearing for their communications, attempted to drive the Turks, who had entrenched themselves there, out of Eupatoria. The Turkish lines formed a salient landward, and each flank was covered by the guns of the allied steamers, six of them being thus moored, but the assault of the Russians failed in every particular. In February, also, the Russians sunk six more vessels to make good the line of obstructions at the mouth of Sevastopol harbor, which had become somewhat disintegrated by the action of the sea, thus forming an inside line of obstructions.
In March the English opened with some hot shot upon two warships in Careening Creek, which had been annoying the French, and drove them out of their position. It cannot too strongly be dwelt upon, in the rapid review we are making of the operations of this war, that the command of the sea was enough to ensure at all times, when the public spirit of the home governments was sufficiently aroused, that reinforcements could be poured into the Crimea without any limit. It was also the pet project of Napoleon the Third largely to increase the force of the allies and wholly to invest Sevastopol, the French to furnish the troops, the English the transport. Of course this was perfectly feasible, and after Inkerman everything seems to have been possible to the allies. This scheme, however, fell through for various reasons, principally because the responsible leaders thought the time had gone by for such an attempt, and that the siege should be pushed, as commenced, to a conclusion.
However, a French army of reserve was assembled at Constantinople and the French steamer fleet was detached from the Crimea to bring this army to the scene of operations. Difficulties engendered by the sometimes conflicting interests of the allies ensued—whether to follow the bent of the French Emperor in the idea of the complete investment of Sevastopol, or to continue the siege already so far advanced, was not yet settled, but a compromise came to be effected resulting in operations between vessels and fortified places, which now come in for some attention. In the meantime, however, on the 9th of April, the allies began a tremendous bombardment upon the works of Sevastopol, having received great accessions of munitions, the most valuable of which were mortars. On the 19th the bombardment ceased, and the work in the trenches recommenced. Great damage had been inflicted upon the Russian works, but no assault followed owing to the diverse desires of the allies at home and in the Peninsula. On May 30th a combined expedition, consisting of 12,000 troops and 40 vessels put to sea from Kamiesh and Balaklava for the purpose of operating by water against the great Russian line of supply by the way of the Don, the Sea of Azov, and from Kertch, or Arabat Spit, to Sevastopol on land. The French part of the expedition, however, was recalled by a fast steamer under telegraphic instructions from France, and the expedition was consequently abandoned. On the 22nd of May, the French having changed leaders, another expedition embarked from Kamiesh with the same objects in view. The troops numbered over 16,000 men in transports convoyed by 12 men-of-war. This expedition to the Sea of Azov had no plans for occupation; it was one of destruction and to break the Russian communications, for, as the river Don offered the best means for throwing supplies into the Peninsula, the Sea of Azov was consequently filled with supply ships and its shores covered with storehouses, the Russian forces on the shores of the Sea of Azov numbering 9000 men.
The Russians, in their preparations, did not contemplate any serious resistance at Kertch or in the Straits of Yenikale—Arabat was the point where their saving energies were to be directed. However, seven good batteries were mounted at Kertch (in all 62 heavy guns were mounted in the Straits) and some vessels were sunk for obstructions, some filled with explosives with electric connections. The channel at Yenikale was difficult and narrow (1 ¼ miles broad) and easily commanded from both sides. The plan of the allies contemplated the seizure of the works at Kertch by a coup-de-main. The Russian commander, as Kinglake says, "succumbed to the power (of which the world will learn much in time yet to come) the power an Armada can wield when not only carrying on board a force designed for land service, but enabled to move, to manoeuvre, at will against an army on shore. The power would be of great urgency under many conditions, but especially so if it happen that the defender of the coast has in charge highly valued possessions divided, the one from the other, by several miles of ground." The Russian commander in presence of this fleet which by its mobility could threaten both points so vital for him to hold, one Kertch, by Kamish Burun, and Arabat Peninsula, by Theodosia, separated by about 70 miles, while he could not divide his forces to hold them both, chose Kertch for abandonment.
The English landed at Kamish Burun, as intended in the first abortive expedition, without opposition, the Russians ruining their own batteries and destroying their grain. A dashing engagement took place under the fire of the batteries between an English gunboat and some Russian gunboats endeavoring to escape into the Sea of Azov, but the Russian vessels being finally outnumbered were destroyed by their commanders, the remaining Russian vessels, save four, also being destroyed by their crews, while the four comparatively powerful steamers escaped into the Sea of Azov. The allied vessels then entered the sea, the channel being buoyed in advance. In view of the destruction of the fleet and batteries in the Straits by the Russians, it is unnecessary to look at their relative strength as compared with that of the allies. There being no retreat for the four escaped steamers of the Russians after the entrance of the allies, owing to the shallow water at the mouth of the Don, their destruction was also ordered. The allied fleets with the aid of a landing party destroyed the shipping and stores at Berdiansk; the next day engaging the fort at Arabat and blowing up a caisson of ammunition, and on the following day Ghenischesk's stores and shipping were destroyed without resistance. A few days later the operation was repeated at Taganrog with some small river steamers and the Coles raft and pinnaces mounting 32-pdrs.
No effective resistance was offered by the defenders at Taganrog as not a mishap was experienced by the attack, and there appears to have been no attempt to fortify the place, other places also yielding without any resistance. From all the operations in the Sea of Azov the allied loss was three men wounded; the Russian loss of combatants was a few score killed or wounded. Sujak Kale, on the eastern shore of the Black Sea, was abandoned on the approach of the allied fleet, 60 guns and 6 mortars being destroyed; Anapa likewise being abandoned with 114 pieces of artillery. The results of this expedition involved the loss to the Czar of nearly 500 vessels, 340 guns, and immense quantities of supplies. Kinglake, remarking upon the ease with which the expedition accomplished its objects, says in effect, that if executed (the expedition) when first urged, the war would have been brought to an end at the time of the Vienna negotiations. In these operations fortifications played no part, being abandoned with but the slightest, if any, effort to hold them.
Little or no harm was done to the fortress at Arabat, the allied fleet bombarding it for several hours and nearly silencing it, but withdrawing without reducing it; a result to be looked for where the landing force does not appear, and the Russians claim to have driven the vessels off. A detachment was left at Kertch to intrench itself and to hold the entrance to the sea. This detachment was soon under observation by a Russian corps.
The results of this expedition were, then, confined to the destruction of stores and to the gaining of the command of the entrance. Afterwards, when the allies were obliged to contract for grain from the United States, they remembered this destruction. There yet remained in the Sea of Azov a line of communications which had not been endangered, that by the Spit of Arabat, and nothing but a land force posted at Arabat or on the neck of the Peninsula could have cut that line. The Russians had now been reduced to such straits and to such passive resistance that the question "what to do" had become a vital one. Todleben, seriously wounded, having withdrawn from the city, the situation was discussed in council, several alternatives presenting themselves for consideration. The Russian army in the field might assault the allied position, either singly or assisted by the garrison of Sevastopol. It might reinforce that garrison in the city for passive defense, or in combination with the garrison, attack the allies in a sortie. The first alternative was chosen, and the battle of the Tchernaya took place, which resulted in a disaster to the Russians, and the siege was evidently drawing quickly to a close—that close so signally characterized by the famous assaults upon the Malakof and Redan batteries. The abandonment of the south side of Sevastopol began immediately after the final assault of the allies by the withdrawal of the garrison to the north side, after blowing up all the magazines and works possible, and was completed on the nth day of September by the sacrifice of the remaining Russian vessels. The Russian army, now relieved of the necessity of defending Sevastopol, took up a strong position, beginning with Inkerman and along the main road behind a chain of heights, and one division was observing the Turks in Eupatoria. Their positions were threatened on both flanks, but the allies were forced to retire.
The fall of Sevastopol did not end the war, and other operations were necessary to bring Russia to terms, though she had lost nearly 250,000 men and the resources of southern Russia were exhausted. The continuance of the war and its conduct were differently regarded by the various powers, but in the end they acted in concert. England had come to be the strongest factor in the combination. Her fleet, troops, and their condition had augmented and improved to the extent that she felt equal to the carrying on of the war single handed. The position of her troops entrenched in Sevastopol with the sea free behind was no longer precarious, as it had been up to the battle of Inkerman with the same command of the sea, and it was greatly better than had been the position of the Russians, for the sea route furnished a better line of communications than did the land route, and a strong position backed by the command of the sea widely differs from a weak position with the same backing.
It having been resolved to undertake other operations, Kinburn was selected as an objective. Kinburn is a long spit commanding the bay where join the Dnieper and the Bug, and connected by a good road with the delta of the Dnieper; consequently its possession by the allies would cut off another important line of communication for the Russians, besides threatening the line by the Isthmus of Perekop. Various works guarded the approach to the bay, whose navigation, in addition, was very intricate. Kinburn Fort itself was a regular casemated work of stone, mounting, at the outside, 41 guns en barbette, 6 in casemates, and 12 mortars. North of it was a sand battery mounting 10 guns, and still north of that was another sand battery mounting also 10 guns, all small 18 and 24-pounders, other guns of heavier calibre and more recent manufacture being on hand but not mounted. Across the mouth of the estuary from Kinburn Spit was Fort Ochakov, a weak affair mounting few guns, on a cape a mile and a quarter distant. The passage or channel, in, is not more than three-quarters of a mile from the forts. Berezan Island stands across the mouth of the bay, but was unfortified. To the westward of Fort Ochakov were three small batteries, mounting, one five guns, the other two, three each. The distance from Kinburn to the delta of the Dnieper is about 30 miles, and the delta itself a most difficult piece of navigation about 15 miles in extent before the river proper is reached. Nicalaev, the present naval arsenal, lies on the Bug about 35 miles above the mouth of the bay. The river from that point to Nicolaev is between two and a half and three miles broad. Its navigation, like all the waters about, being very intricate. The bend at or below Nicolaev is narrower than the lower part of the river, and the shores at that point were well fortified, the river itself being obstructed. On the right bank of the river, about seven miles above the actual mouth, a spit projected into the stream, narrowing the channel considerably. In a fissure in the face of the cliff were mounted four guns of good size and elevated about 100 feet, these guns commanding the entire width of the river. All the shores were provided with telegraphs and patrolled, and field artillery moved from point to point, the distance from Kinburn to the Isthmus of Perekop being about 90 miles. The work before the expedition was to gain possession of Kinburn and its opposite fortifications, and from these points to
strike other objectives, either by water or by the road before mentioned connecting Kinburn and Chesme. The English part of the expedition consisted of 6 line-of-battle ships, mounting 583 guns, 17 steam frigates and sloops mounting 247 guns, 10 gunboats mounting 28 guns, 6 mortar vessels and 10 transports. The French had 4 line-of-battle ships, several steam frigates and a number of gun and mortar vessels. In addition there were three steam floating batteries—the Devastation, Lave, and Tonnant—carrying 22 50-pounders each; they were 172 feet long, 44 feet broad, the sloping sides being covered with 4 ½ inches of iron) with a 17-inch wood backing. They had been prepared when it had become apparent through other operations that vessels of an especial type were required in siege operations, and it appear-s that they resembled somewhat the Confederate type of ironclad.
The expedition sailed from Kamiesh on the 7th of October in full sight of the Russians on the north side of the city. The rendezvous was 5 miles S. by E. of Odessa. On the evening of the 8th the expedition, numbering upwards of 80 vessels, anchored off Odessa, and some small, swift steamers left to reconnoitre the proposed theatre of action. Odessa lies close to the water, a little elevated above it. The water front was lined with casemates and other works provided with numerous guns. Yet this was a case where vessels could, with considerable impunity, bombard the city. The range was immaterial, as the target was a city, while for the shore defenses close to the city the target was only ships at a distance. Both the English and French commanders were opposed to bombarding. It seems there is little woodwork in the construction of the city. The experience at Sevastopol, where the city so long had undergone a bombardment, when it had suffered really so little from the Russian endeavors to destroy it, was remembered. Great damage and distress might have been caused by a bombardment, but before destruction or subjection could have been secured the ammunition would have been dangerously low. The proposition to bombard nightly with a few vessels was also rejected, on the ground that it would have to come to an end, and then the Russians might claim a victory. The mere matter of standing in and bombarding open coast cities does not appear to be the simple affair we so often hear it made out to be. Russell asserts that the fleet did not carry ammunition enough to lay Odessa in ruins, but the demonstration had the effect of drawing troops from the intended point of attack, and while the fleet lay before Odessa every effort was made to produce the impression that the city was to be attacked. The general orders for the attack on Kinburn provided that the line-of-battle ships were to anchor in line ahead, abreast Kinburn Fort and the sand batteries, and at a distance of about 1200 yards, with the French ships forming the south of the line. The southern ship, as the guide, was to bring Kinburn due east. She was to be preceded by two sounding vessels. This would bring a due portion of the line-of-battle ships to act against each work, and in approaching would minimize the danger from the fire of the works. The floating batteries were to be placed S.W. from Fort Kinburn in line ahead at a distance of 600 yards. The mortar vessels were to be moored in an east and west line extending from the shore south of the fort and about 2800 yards from Fort Kinburn. Some frigates were to take position ahead of the line-of-battle ships, while some of the smaller steamers and gunboats were to take positions in the intervals between the other vessels. Some were to enter the bay and attack and enfilade the works from that side, and some were to cover the landing of the troops. The frigates were to be posted as shown in order to be at hand to support the gunboats in the bay in case they were attacked by vessels proceeding from the Bug. Vessels were told off to buoy the dangerous shoals in advance, and on the 14th of October the fleet weighed from Odessa and anchored in the afternoon three miles west of Kinburn. On the 15th the troops were landed unopposed four miles below the fort, and immediately intrenched themselves. From these intrenchments they advanced and opened a parallel at 700 yards distant from the fort, on the morning of the 17th. On the same morning the fleet moved in as arranged, the floating batteries, gunboats and mortar vessels preceding, and opening fire about 10 o'clock. The line-of-battle ships followed with precision, some of the heavy ships entering the bay in addition to the gunboats, delivering their broadsides in passing, and taking up flanking positions.
It is not worth while to enter into further details. The buildings interior to the fort were soon in flames, magazines were exploded, and shortly not a single gun could be served. It is difficult to imagine any fortification standing under such circumstances. The fleet had taken a commanding position where it had isolated Kinburn Fort from its supporting works on the north side of the entrance, and completely overwhelmed it. The defense was as brave as possible, and only ceased when not a gun could be fired. In Kinburn Fort 29 guns were completely disabled. On the 18th the Russians mined the fort at Ochakov, and a body of troops set out on a reconnaissance toward Kherson, supported by a squadron on the left flank. On the 20th the French admiral stood in for the bay, and shortly after an English squadron stood in to the bay, both bound for the Bug and the mouth of the Dnieper. The French squadron ascended the river as far as the Spit without seeing anything and then returned. The English commander determined to have a look and went up in the Stromboli, a steam sloop, and with a number of gunboats. Upon arrival off the Spit the cliff battery, before referred to, and the field artillery opened upon the squadron, when a small engagement followed, the Russians firing short to draw the English in. The engagement was unimportant and unnecessary, but illustrated again the value of high command for batteries and of invisibility, while the squadron could easily have run by the batteries. Russell says: "When you came to squint along a gun and saw only four little black eyes staring at you over a parapet of earth which did not seem three inches high, you began to understand the difficulty of striking such objects." It was completely recognized that no successful demonstration could be made by vessels alone against Nicolaev, and troops sufficient for a coup-de-main had not been provided. The vessels would have had to encounter batteries, obstructions and gunboats, besides being continually under fire from flying batteries. On the 21st a small French squadron stood up the river and anchored off the Spit at 1500 and 1800 yards and opened fire. Shots were exchanged for half an hour, and the French claim to have dismounted one gun. The reconnaissance by land towards Kherson succeeded in laying waste the country for a number of miles. The mouths of the Dnieper and the Bug were blockaded, and no attempts whatever were made by Russian vessels supposed to be at Nicolaev to inflict any damage.
The main body of the fleet was held at Kinburn in the meantime, and sailed on the 29th for Kamiesh, leaving a garrison of French troops in Kinburn Fort, which had been restored and armed with ship's guns, and a covering flotilla was also left. The position was made so strong that even in winter, when the straits were frozen over, no attempt was made upon it. The expedition had accomplished part of its work, but the line of communication by Perekop was still open. In December Kars fell into the hands of the Russians, but its fall had no effects on the situation in the Crimea. It only saved their pride a little, and counted later in a trade for Sevastopol. The winter was passed in destroying the docks and fortifications, and on the 30th of March, 1856, the treaty of Paris was signed. In this treaty the Czar and the Sultan engaged not to establish or to maintain upon the Black Sea any military or maritime arsenal.
A brief retrospect of the situation at the end of the war and its events will show wherein the navy as an important factor succeeded and wherein it failed, where it was properly or improperly used in coast attack, and its dependence for complete success upon adequate support from landing parties. In the first place, concerning the disputed point as to the possibilities of a combined attack upon the north side and the flank march, it is absolutely impossible to form a satisfactory opinion. The Russians, with Todleben at their head, have insisted that the attack if made undoubtedly would have succeeded, and that the defeat of the Alma had so filled them with consternation that for three days they had no thought of making any defense. The flank march was discovered from the tower of the Naval Library, and when communicated to the leaders in Sevastopol and to Menschikoff in the field that they took heart. "Give me five days and I'll mount three guns to their two," said Todleben, and he did. They claim that an immediate assault on either side would have succeeded. Everything, and the great weight of authority, seems to point to the fact that a direct attack on the north side by the fleet and the army would have succeeded at once, but for the circumstance pointed out by Sir Edward Hamley that the harbor was efficiently obstructed before the assault could have been made. A military afterthought has given cause for congratulation that the place did not fall at once, which, while outside the subject, is interesting. It is to the effect that peace was forced upon Russia through her military exhaustion, caused by the tremendous efforts she felt compelled to put forth to sustain the siege, and that better terms were thus secured for the allies. The precarious condition of the allies, in spite of the absolute command of the sea, has already been pointed out. A defeat at the Alma, at Balaklava, or at Inkerman might not have been fatal, but it may be surmised that such might have been the case. The necessity for sufficient and well-handled landing forces, as pointed out so insistently by Admiral Colomb, is certainly emphasized. The converse is equally true for the power whose country is invaded, not to give battle without a good chance to make it decisive. Menschikoff has always been severely criticized and blamed on all sides for his course in considering at vital moments his army in the field as of the first importance, and the safety of Sevastopol as secondary. The reinforcements that were thrown into Sevastopol before the first attack were only wrung from him with the greatest difficulty. Yet it may be believed, in view of the near approach he made to victory at Inkerman, that he was, in the main, right. A victory over the allied forces meant the safety of Sevastopol, and although, as it was said, Sevastopol was the kernel of which the Crimea was but the shell, the kernel would have been better preserved by military successes in the field than by sustaining a siege. In the actual attack made by the fleet upon the fortifications, under the circumstances surrounding it, it is hard to discover any merit. The most valuable services rendered by the fleet in addition to the vital one of maintaining communications were the attempts on the Russian lines of supply, and herein it seems to have done all that was possible. Where complete success was not attained the lack of landing forces is apparent, whether the condition of affairs or not allowed them to be detached for that duty. At the end of the war the Russian army in force and fairly well provided for, lay about Bakchi Serai and Simpheropol in a central position. The allies were based in Kertch, Baidar, Balaklava, Kamiesh, Sevastopol, Eupatoria and Kinburn.
The Russian communications had been destroyed by the navy, by the Don, by the military road in Circassia, by the Bug, and between Nicolaev and Kherson by Kherson Bay. They remained, however, intact by the Spit of Arabat, by a road through the Mud Sea, by Perekop, and between Odessa and Kherson by land. To have cut these lines it would have been necessary to have seized Nicolaev, Kherson, and perhaps Perekop, to have destroyed Ghenischesk, and to have held the country about Arabat. All this belonged to the army, and none of it was done. The Crimea never suffered a military occupation nor did Sevastopol itself, in the true significance of the term. The war was brought to a close through the exhaustion of the Empire, with the hostile armies still facing each other.
In this short but hard-fought war it would seem that the navy, mistress of the sea, did all, as it happened, that could possibly have been done, nearly all that belonged to it to do, and in one case, at least, passed beyond the limits of safe and reasonable action. Such destruction as it inflicted was done as a military necessity. We certainly do not see the battle fleets, mistresses of the sea, turning their power of attack and destruction, lacking adversaries worthy of their steel, against all the cities of the Littoral, fortified or not fortified, peaceful or warlike, burning them, destroying them, or bleeding them without mercy. We do see, however, where in attacks of certain descriptions upon a coast the efficiency of a navy stops short at a well-defined point.